The Context and Consequence of Qassem Soleimani's Killing

Major_General_Qassem_Soleimani_at_the_International_Day_of_Mosque_(2).jpg

Mehlaqa Samdani

January 7, 2020

In the early morning hours of January 3, 2020, U.S. President Donald Trump ordered a drone strike against Qassem Soleimani, the leader of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards’ Quds Force.  For the past 22 years, Soleimani had led the elite military force and had been responsible for military operations outside Iran that targeted Iran’s enemies. Though considered a terrorist by the United States, Soleimani was a highly revered and celebrated figure in Iran and most lauded for his operations against ISIS in Iraq and Syria. 

The January 3 missile strike also killed Abu Mahdi Al-Muhandis, founder of Kataib Hezbollah, an Iran backed militia group in Iraq that had agitated against U.S. presence in the country. 

By all accounts, this move by the Trump administration marks a dramatic and dangerous escalation of hostilities between the United States and Iran and one that would be difficult to dial down as Iran prepares for retaliatory attacks against the United States.

1.    What were the series of events that led to Soleimani’s killing?

The latest round of tensions started in August 2019 when Hashd (the umbrella organization that Kataib and other groups are a part of), blamed Israel and the U.S. for drone attacks on its facilities--neither country claimed responsibility. On December 27, the U.S. blamed Kataib Hezbollah for an unclaimed attack on an Iraqi military base that killed an American contractor. Two days later, the U.S. struck Kataib forces in Iraq and Syria, killing 24 members of the group that led to the storming of the U.S. embassy on New Year’s Eve. Three days after that, the U.S. targeted Qassem Soleimani. 

 

2.    How will Iran and its proxies respond? 

Senior military officials in Iran have maintained that they will only target U.S. military sites in retaliation. Iran’s main partner in the region reinforced this position on January 6 when Hezbollah’s leader Hassan Nasrallah issued the following statement

“I want to be very clear, we don’t mean the American people. All across the region there are American citizens—traders, journalists, engineers, and doctors. They cannot be touched… any harm to U.S. civilians will only serve Trump’s agenda.”

However, it is unclear how other groups or militias in the region connected to Soleimani (but beyond Iranian government control) would act to avenge his death. 

Analysts believe the Iranian government will take its time before attacking U.S. interests so as to maintain the element of surprise. However, given Iran’s debilitated economic situation, it is highly unlikely that it would want a full-scale conflagration with the United States. 

Trump for his part, threatened to bomb 52 Iranian cultural sites if Iran retaliates—some of these landmarks are identified as World Heritage sites by UNESCO. If this threat is carried out, it would tantamount to a war crime under international law. With Trump’s threat widely condemned around the world, Pentagon officials scrambled to distance themselves from Trump’s assertion, emphasizing they will follow the laws of armed conflict.

 

3.    What strategic benefit did the U.S. gain from Soleimani’s death?

Even those bitterly opposed to Soleimani, are hard pressed to find any strategic benefit for the U.S. in his assassination. There are some, like Dexter Filkins of the New Yorker, who believe that Soleimani’s death dealt a ‘body blow’[1] to the Iranian regime and it will take time for the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps to recover from his loss.  However, IRGC expert Narges Bajoghli, believes that the institution is structured in a way where “decisions and actions don’t just come from one man or even a small group of men; many within the organization have experience building relationships, creating strategies and making decisions.”

In a recent interview, Middle East expert Meghan O’Sullivan[2], speculated one reason to target a leader as powerful as Soleimani might have been to precipitate the collapse of the Iranian regime. However, Soleimani’s death had the exact opposite effect, at least in the short-term. 

The Iranian government, that just three weeks ago was grappling with internal protests and anti-Iran protests in Iraq, appears to be now unified within and with Iraq in its mourning of a revered leader. Two days after the killing, the Iraqi parliament encouraged by outgoing Prime Minister Mahdi approved a draft bill calling for the withdrawal of American troops from the country. 

Soleimani’s killing has also exposed Americans to greater risk. Immediately following the drone strike, American citizens inside Iraq were urged to evacuate immediately.  Similarly, U.S.- led forces in Iraq and Syria announced a temporary pause in operations against ISIS to ensure security for themselves against a possible Iranian attack.  

4.    Why did the President choose to target Soleimani now?

It seems increasingly likely that this was an impulsive decision made hastily by President Trump. According to Rukmini Callamachi of the New York Times, the decision to launch the attack against Soleimani ‘was chaotic and….was the ‘far out option’ given to Trump by his advisors.  

According to a Times report: 

“Aides said Mr. Trump was angry about a rocket attack last week by forces linked to Tehran that killed an American civilian contractor and stewed as he watched television images of pro-Iranian demonstrators storming the American Embassy in Baghdad in the days that followed, neither of which would normally result in such a seemingly disproportionate retaliation.”

Contrary to what administration officials have been citing in support of the strike, Rukmini Callimachi reports that evidence of any imminent attack was ‘razor thin’

Members of the Trump administration will brief certain members of Congress on Wednesday on the threat Soleimani posed—this will be classified information and it remains to be seen if the bipartisan ‘Gang of Eight’ congressional leaders will be convinced by the evidence provided. After all, this briefing will come on the heels of Washington Post’s Afghanistan papers, which revealed how previous administrations kept the public and Congress in the dark about the failure of the reconstruction/war effort in Afghanistan. 

Many contend that this was a way for Trump to distract from impeachment proceedings and to get himself re-elected later this year. While it is difficult to determine what this president might be thinking, neither argument seems convincing. With impeachment already completed in the House, and the Senate process appearing to be a muddled and drawn out one, it does not seem likely that Trump feels particularly threatened by it all. Similarly, starting a war to rally support when the presidential election is still ten months away, does not make any sense. Simply put, it doesn’t appear as if Trump needed a diversion at this particular time. 

5.    Was the attack against Soleimani legal?

There is a broad consensus among legal experts that Article 2 of the U.S. constitution gives the president of the United States far-reaching authority to use military force abroad.  As long as the executive branch can prove that force was used to advance the national interest and that the military operation was limited in scope, the president’s action would be considered legal. Ultimately, however, there is a lot of latitude given to the executive branch in its interpretation and implementation of these conditions--historically both the judicial and legislative branches have been reluctant to curtail the president’s constitutional authority in this regard. The 1973 War Powers Resolution does require the president to cease the military operation within 60-90 days if it had been authorized without congressional approval.

In his detailed exploration of the legality of the drone strike that killed Soleimani, Brookings expert, Scott Anderson believes the Trump administration could argue that killing Soleimani fulfilled the national interest condition, given the military commander’s previous operations against the United States. However, given the risk of further escalation, it might be more difficult for the administration to prove that this operation was limited in scope. As Anderson points out, the president will mostly likely rely on statutory authorization to justify the strike against Soleimani. This authority is provided by the Authorization of the Use of Military Force (AUMFs) passed in 2001 and 2002—these were employed for use of force against Al-Qaida, affiliates and for operations in Iraq, and give the president extensive authority to use military force in the region. 

While American domestic law is very deferential to presidential authority on the use of force, international law is less so. UN Rapporteur on Extrajudicial Killings, Agnes Callamard denounced the strike as a clear violation of international human rights law. She went on to say:

“The targeted killings of Qasem Soleiman and Abu Mahdi Al-Muhandis are most likely unlawful and violate international human rights law: Outside the context of active hostilities, the use of drones or other means for targeted killing is almost never likely to be legal”

6.    Can the president’s war-making powers be curtailed?

In the summer of 2019, when congressional representatives from both parties were alarmed at the president’s sabre rattling with Iran, they proposed a bill as an amendment to the National Defense Authorization Act to block funding for war with Iran. While the amendment passed in the House, it only received 50 votes in the Senate. There are currently a number of bills planned that would allow Congress to reassert its authority with regards to the presidential use of force. 

Rep. Ro Khanna and Senator Bernie Sanders plan to re-introduce the above-mentioned bill once Congress is back in session this week. In addition, Nancy Pelosi is seeking a vote on the War Powers Resolution that will force debate and a vote on the need for congressional authorization for any use of force against Iran. The hope there is that with this dangerous escalation, and in anticipation of how Trump will respond after Iran retaliates, there will be more of an impetus for Congress to pass this bill. 

 


[1] Dexter Filkins interview on ‘Fareed Zakaria GPS’, Sunday, December 5, 2020

[2] Meghan O’ Sullivan interview on ‘Fareed Zakaria GPS’, Sunday, December 5, 2020